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Abstract. In this paper we present a new primitive for a key exchange protocol based on mul-
tivariate non-commutative polynomial rings, analogous to the classic Diffie-Hellman method.
Our technique extends the proposed scheme of Boucher et al. from 2010. Their method was
broken by Dubois and Kammerer in 2011, who exploited the Euclidean domain structure of
the chosen ring. However, our proposal is immune against such attacks, without losing the
advantages of non-commutative polynomial rings as outlined by Boucher et al. Moreover, our
extension is not restricted to any particular ring, but is designed to allow users to readily choose
from a large class of rings when applying the protocol. Our primitive can also be applied to
other cryptographic paradigms. In particular, we develop a three-pass protocol, a public key
cryptosystem, a digital signature scheme and a zero-knowledge proof protocol.
Keywords: Cryptography, non-commutative, multivariate polynomial rings, skew-polynomials, Ore
algebra
1 Introduction
In 2010, Boucher et al. [BGG+10] proposed a novel Diffie-Hellman-like key exchange protocol [DH76]
based on skew-polynomial rings. An outline of their method can be given as follows (with adapted
notation): Two communicating parties, Alice and Bob, publicly agree on an element L in a prede-
termined skew-polynomial ring, and on a subset S of commuting elements in this ring. Alice then
chooses two private keys PA, QA from S and sends Bob the product PA ·L ·QA. Bob similarly chooses
PB , QB from S and sends Alice PB ·L ·QB . Alice computes PA ·PB ·L ·QB ·QA, while Bob computes
PB ·PA ·L ·QA ·QB . Since PA ·PB = PB ·PA, and QA ·QB = QB ·QA, Alice and Bob have computed
the same final element, which can be used as a secret key, either directly or by hashing. Boucher et
al. claimed that it would be intractable for an eavesdropper, Eve, to compute this secret key with
knowledge only of L, S, PA · L ·QA and PB · L ·QB . They based their claim on the difficulty of the
factorization problem in skew-polynomial rings, in particular the non-uniqueness of factorizations.
However, in 2011, Dubois and Kammerer exploited the fact that the concrete skew-polynomial
ring chosen by Boucher et al. is a Euclidean domain to successfully attack their protocol [DK11].
Following their approach, an eavesdropper Eve chooses a random element e ∈ S, and computes the
greatest common right divisor of PA ·L ·QA · e = PA ·L · e ·QA with PA ·L ·QA, which is with high
probability equal to QA. From this point on, Eve can easily recover the agreed upon key between Alice
and Bob. Moreover, the authors also criticized the suggested brute-force method for Alice and Bob
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to generate commuting polynomials, as most of the commuting polynomials turn out to be central
and thus the possible choices for private keys becomes fairly small. (An element of a ring is central
if it commutes with all other elements of the ring.)
After Dubois and Kammerer’s paper, interest in the application of non-commutative polynomial
rings appears to have dwindled, since to the best of our knowledge no further publications considering
non-commutative polynomial rings in cryptographic contexts have appeared.
It is our position that such rings can still be used as a foundation of a secure Diffie-Hellman-like
protocol. The basic weakness in the scheme presented in [BGG+10] lies in the choice of a univariate
Ore extension as the underlying ring of the protocol, as these rings are Euclidean domains. However,
the construction of Ore extensions can be iterated, and the resulting multivariate Ore polynomial
rings will no longer be principal ideal domains (and therefore not Euclidean domains). This would
preclude any attack of the type proposed by Dubois and Kammerer.
The contributions of this paper are the following:
– We present a method of constructing non-commutative algebras to use in the protocol as presented
in [BGG+10]. The creation of algebras in this fashion ensures that the Diffie-Hellman-like key
exchange will not be subject to attacks as described in [DK11]. At the same time the desirable
properties such as non-uniqueness of the factorization remain present, as well as key-generation
in a feasible amount of time.
– For our choice of non-commutative algebras, no polynomial time factorization algorithm for their
elements is known. For most of them, there is not even a general factorization technique, i.e.
one that is applicable to any element, discovered yet and, as some of them do not even have the
property of being Noetherian, factorization algorithms may not even exist.
– This paper addresses the critique given in [DK11] concerning the feasible construction of a set
S of commuting, non-central elements, from which the two communicating parties choose their
private keys. We show an efficient way to construct commuting polynomials, which is independent
from the choice of the algebra.
– We have made an experimental implementation of the key-exchange protocol using our proposed
rings, in order to examine the practical feasibility of our primitive. Furthermore, we have created
challenge problems for the reader who wishes to examine the security of our schemes.
– Attacks based on the key-choice of A and B are studied for a concrete algebra and an overview
of weak keys and their detection is presented.
– We also study the application of multivariate Ore polynomials to other cryptographic paradigms:
a three-pass protocol, a public key cryptosystem, a digital signature scheme and a zero-knowledge
proof protocol.
In the rest of this section, we will introduce some basic notations and definitions. Moreover,
we present the main ring structures which will be used for the various cryptographic protocols.
Furthermore, related work and the potential for these rings to be used in post-quantum cryptosystems
will be discussed.
In section 2, we show how multivariate Ore polynomial rings can be applied as a primitive for a
Diffie-Hellman-like key exchange protocol. We will argue its correctness, its efficiency and its security.
Section 3 describes an implementation of our proposal for a specific choice of the non-commutative
ring. Experimental results are presented for different input-sizes.
In section 4, we discuss some known insecure keys for a particular ring, namely the nth Weyl
algebra. The described construction cannot always be generalized to other rings, albeit it provides a
guideline for the study of insecure keys in rings that can be used in cryptographic protocols.
Before our conclusion in section 6, we present in section 5 applications of multivariate Ore poly-
nomial rings to other cryptographic paradigms.
1.1 Basic Notations and Definitions
Throughout the whole paper, R denotes an arbitrary domain with identity. For practical reasons
we furthermore assume for any introduced ring that it is computable, i.e. one can find a finite
representation of its elements, and that all arithmetics can be done in polynomial time. Also a
random choice of an element in the ring R is assumed to be possible with polynomial costs.
Let us address the basic construction principles of so-called Ore extensions [Ore33] of R. We follow
the notions from [BGTV03], which we also recommend as a resource for a thorough introduction into
the field of algorithmic non-commutative algebra.
Definition 1 ([BGTV03], Definition 3.1). Let σ be a ring endomorphism of R. A σ-derivation
of R is an additive endomorphism δ : R → R with the property that δ(rs) = σ(r)δ(s) + δ(r)s for all
r, s ∈ R. We call the pair (σ, δ) a quasi-derivation.
Proposition 1 ([BGTV03], Proposition 3.3.). Let (σ, δ) be a quasi-derivation on R. Then there
exists a ring S with the following properties:
1. R is a subring of S;
2. there exists an element ∂ ∈ S such that S is freely generated as a left R-module by the positive
powers 1, ∂, ∂2, . . . of ∂;
3. for every r ∈ R, we have ∂r = σ(r)∂ + δ(r).
Definition 2 (cf. [BGTV03], Definition 3.4). The ring S defined by the previous result and
denoted by R[∂ ;σ, δ] is usually referred to as an Ore extension of R.
General Assumption: As we want the Ore extension to have at least the property of being a
domain, we assume from now on that σ is always injective (compare [BGTV03], Proposition 3.10). In
order to keep the costs of arithmetics in R[∂ ;σ, δ] polynomial, we make two additional assumptions:
(i) There exist polynomial time algorithms to compute σ(r) and δ(r) for any given r ∈ R.
(ii) Either σ is the identity map, or δ is the zero map.
While item (i) seems to be a natural assumption, item (ii) may seem highly restrictive. But these
cases cover several algebras that are studied in practice, as we will point out in the examples below.
The need for this condition comes from the result of the following lemma, which can be easily proven
by induction on n ∈ N.
Lemma 1. Let R[∂ ;σ, δ] be an Ore extension of R, and let r be an arbitrary element in R. Then we
have the following identity for n ∈ N:
∂nr = σn(r)∂n +
( ∑
θ∈Sn•[σ, . . . , σ︸ ︷︷ ︸
n−1 times
,δ]
θ1 ◦ . . . ◦ θn ◦ r
)
∂n−1 + . . .
+
( ∑
θ∈Sn•[σ,δ,...,δ]
θ1 ◦ . . . ◦ θn ◦ r
)
∂ + δn(r),
where Sn denotes the permutation group on n elements and • the canonical action of the group on a
list with n elements.
Without item (ii), when multiplying elements in S, we would have to compute up to 2n images
of an element r ∈ R resulting from all different ways of applying n times functions chosen from the
set {σ, δ}. This is avoided by choosing one of the maps to be trivial, i.e. by our assumption (ii).
Example 1. For the Ore extensions considered in the paper [BGG+10], the authors assumed R to be
a finite field, σ to be a power of the Frobenius automorphism on R and δ to be the zero map.
Example 2. The construction of a commutative polynomial ring over a given ring R can be viewed
as an Ore extension by choosing σ to be the identity map and δ to be the zero map.
Remark 1. If we choose σ not to be an automorphism, then our constructed ring is not necessarily
Noetherian, which makes the general factorization problem even harder to solve. An example of a
non-Noetherian Ore extension is the following:
LetK be a field. Set R := K[y], the univariate polynomial ring overK. Define σ : R→ R, f(y) 7→ f(y2)
and set δ to be the zero map. Then (σ, δ) is a quasi-derivation, and the ringR[∂ ;σ, δ] is not Noetherian.
A proof of this, and a more thorough discussion, can be found in [MR01], section 1.3.2.
The process of building an Ore extension can be iterated. The rings that we propose to use for a
key exchange protocol are of the form
S := R[∂1;σ1, δ1][∂2;σ2, δ2] . . . [∂n;σn, δn], (1)
where N 3 n > 1, R is a domain with identity element, and for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, either σi is the
identity map, or δi is the zero map, according to our general assumptions. We will refer to these
rings throughout the paper as rings of type (1). Furthermore, the σi are injective, and there exists
a subring R˜ 6= {0} of the center of R, such that for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and r ∈ R˜ : σi(r) = r and
δi(r) = 0. We refer to R˜ as the subring of constants.
The condition n > 1 gives us the property that our ring is neither a left nor a right principal ideal
domain and therefore there exists no notion of a left- or right greatest common divisor. Thus, our
construction of a Diffie-Hellman-like key exchange protocol would not be vulnerable to the methods
introduced in [DK11].
The condition that R˜, whose elements are not subject to any non-commutative relation, exists, is
needed later to construct commutative subrings in rings of type (1).
There will be two kinds of rings of type (1) that will serve as model examples throughout the
paper:
Definition 3. The so-called nth Weyl algebra An is an Ore extension of type (1). For this, let
K˜ be an arbitrary field, and K := K˜(x1, . . . , xn). Define for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} the σi to be identity
maps, and define δi to be the partial derivation with respect to xi. Thus, ∂ixi = σi(xi)∂i + δi(xi) =
xi∂i + x
′
i = xi∂i + 1. But ∂i commutes with all other xj, where j 6= i. Also, ∂i, ∂j always commute,
as do xi, xj. Finally K˜ is the subring of constants of S.
Example 3. The rings used in [BGG+10], namely Fq[∂ ;σ] with σ ∈ Aut(Fq), are single Ore extensions
of a finite field Fq, where q is some positive power of a prime number p. One can iterate the extension
of this ring, and create Fq[∂1;σ1] . . . [∂n;σn], where σ1, . . . , σn ∈ Aut(Fq). (Thus, if c ∈ Fq, then
∂ic = σi(c)∂i. But ∂i, ∂j commute, for all i, j.)
The factorization properties of a ring S that has the form (1) are different from commutative
multivariate polynomial rings. In particular, S is not a unique factorization domain in the classical
sense, i.e. factors are not just unique up to permutation and multiplication by units. Factors in S are
unique up to the following notion of similarity.
Definition 4 (cf. [BGTV03], Definition 4.9). Let R be a domain. Two elements r, s ∈ R are
said to be similar, if R/Rr and R/Rs are isomorphic as left R-modules.
In general, given an element p ∈ S, which has two different complete factorizations
p = p1 · · · pm = p˜1 · · · p˜k,
where m, k ∈ N, there exists for every i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} at least one j ∈ {1, . . . , k} such that pi is similar
to p˜j (cf. [Jac43], [Ore33]). This means, that the position of similar elements in different factorizations
is not fixed.
Example 4. Let us state a simple example in A2, that can be found in [Lan02]:
h := (∂1 + 1)
2(∂1 + x1∂2) ∈ A2.
Besides the given factorization in the definition of h, we have the following decomposition into irre-
ducible elements:
h = (x1∂1∂2 + ∂
2
1 + x1∂2 + ∂1 + 2∂2)(∂1 + 1).
The corresponding decision problem, of deciding whether two given polynomials are similar, is
not known to be possible in polynomial time to the best of our knowledge, although attempts have
been made [CVHL10].
One possible attack is to factor elements in non-commutative polynomial rings. However, besides
the fact that factoring is currently intractable in this setup, the non-uniqueness of the factorization
adds another difficulty for an attack based on factorization. As the next example illustrates, one
might end up with infinitely many factorizations, from which one has to choose the correct one.
Example 5. Let K in Definition 3 be of characteristic zero and consider ∂21 ∈ An. Besides factoring
into ∂1 · ∂1, it also factors for all c ∈ K into(
∂1 +
1
x1 + c
)
·
(
∂1 − 1
x1 + c
)
.
Remark 2. In Algorithm 1, we are exclusively using the multiplicative structure of the ring S. Only
the generation of random elements causes us to apply addition. It is to be emphasized, that (S, ·),
i.e. the elements in S equipped with the multiplication operator, do not form a group but a monoid.
This is due to the fact that the variables introduced by the Ore extension (i.e. ∂1, . . . , ∂n) do not
have a multiplicative inverse.
1.2 Potential as a Post-Quantum Cryptosystem
Here we will try to give some plausible grounds for our conjecture, that the factorization problem for
our rings cannot be solved in polynomial time, even with quantum algorithms.
This stems from the observation that factors of an Ore polynomial p can be very large compared
with p itself. Indeed, in terms of bit length representations, the size of the factors can be exponential
in the size of p. For example, consider the Chebyshev differential operator
L :=
(
1− x21
)
∂21 − x1∂1 + n2, (2)
as an element in A1, where n is a real constant. When n is a positive integer, one can show that L
has two possible factorizations. Furthermore, when n is prime one can show that these factors will
contain Ω(n) non-zero terms in expanded representation. Thus their bit size grows at least as fast as
n, while the size of L itself grows only as log n. Consequently, the sizes of the factors are exponentially
larger than the size of L. If the reader wishes to try some experimentation in Maple, we provide a
code snippet in appendix A.1.
Now, for the decision problem, “Is L factorable?”, the obvious certificate for verification of a
“yes” answer would be an actual pair of factors of L. But as we can see from this example, the
size of such a certificate may not be polynomial in the input size of L. Furthermore, this problem
is already occurring for the simplest possible case: a second-order operator in a univariate Ore ring.
Our proposal works with much higher-order operators over many variables, so the relative size of
such a certificate of factors will not improve, and may even become worse.
Of course, this does not prove that a polynomial-sized certificate could not exist. But we do not
know of any, and hence we suspect that this problem may not even belong to the class NP . As there
is some thought that NP-complete problems would not have polynomial time quantum algorithms
(see e.g. [Bro01], page 297), we are therefore led to conjecture that our factorization problem would
not have any such algorithm, either.
Note, though, that the above example was over a field of characteristic zero. We actually prefer to
work over finite fields, to reduce expression swell in the computations. For such fields, we do not know
of any examples where the bit-size of the factors is exponentially larger than the input-polynomial.
However, even for univariate differential polynomials, there are no known polynomial time algorithms
for factorization or deciding irreducibility, for either classical or quantum computers. For Noetherian
rings over finite fields, the hardness of factorization is less clear, though there are still no known
polynomial time algorithms for the multivariate case. But even if one exists for Noetherian rings over
finite fields, one could instead choose a ring having a non-Noetherian extension. As mentioned above,
we are skeptical that there is any polynomial time algorithm for this case, using a classical computer.
Furthermore, unless there is some property of the non-Noetherian ring that a quantum algorithm
can take advantage of, we conjecture the same is true for quantum computers.
1.3 Related Work
There exist a polynomial time algorithms that factor univariate Ore-polynomials over finite fields,
namely [Gie98, GZ03]. This includes the skew-polynomials as used in [BGG+10]. Boucher et al.
argued that even if an attacker can find a factorization using this algorithm, then it might not be
the right one to discover the key A and B agreed upon. This can be true for certain choices of
polynomials, but there is more theory needed to prove that there is a certain lower bound on the
number of different factorizations.
For certain single Ore extensions of a univariate commutative polynomial ring or function field
there are several algorithms and even implementations available. This is due to the fact that those
extensions are algebraic generalizations of operator algebras. The most prominent publications that
deal with factoring in the first Weyl algebra are [vH97b, vH96, vH97a, vHY10, GS04]; the algorithms
of the first four papers are implemented in the computer algebra system Maple [MGH+08], and
that of the fifth paper in ALLTYPES [Sch09]. For factoring elements in the first Weyl algebra with
polynomial coefficients, there is an implementation [HL13] in the computer algebra system Singular
[DGPS12]. The implementation also extends to the shift algebra and classes of polynomials in the
so-called first q-Weyl algebra. Theoretical results for those operator algebras are shown in [Tsa94]
and [Tsa96], which extend the papers [Loe03] and [Loe06].
The factorization problem for general multivariate Ore algebras has not, as of yet, been as well
investigated.
A thorough theoretic overview of the factorization problem in Ore domains is presented in
[BGTV03].
Recently, the techniques from [HL13] were extended to factor elements in the nth Weyl algebra,
the nth shift algebra and classes of polynomials in the nth q-Weyl algebra [GHL14]. However, the
algorithm uses Gro¨bner-bases [Buc97], and therefore does not run in polynomial time [MM82].
From an algebraic point of view, and dealing only with strictly polynomial non-commutative
algebras, Melenk and Apel [MA94] developed a package for the computer algebra system REDUCE.
That package provides tools to deal with certain non-commutative polynomial algebras and also
contains a factorization algorithm for the supported algebras.
Beals and Kartashova [BK05] consider the problem of factoring polynomials in the second Weyl
algebra, where they are able to deduce parametric factors. Research in a similar direction was done
by Shemyakova in [She07, She09, She10].
Another key exchange protocol based on non-commutative rings is presented in [CNT12]. The
ring chosen in this publication is the ring of endomorphisms of Zp×Zp2 , which is also not a principal
ideal domain and therefore not subject to an attack as shown in [DK11]. It should be noted that the
authors used the same technique as in this paper for constructing commuting elements.
Using a different non-commutative ring, which is a Z-module, Cao et al. have presented a similar
key-exchange protocol in [CDW07]. The authors also use the same idea to construct commuting
elements, but their work furthermore considers some other non-abelian groups. We are not aware of
any known attack on this system.
An approach for using non-abelian groups to generate a public key cryptosystem was developed
by Ko et al. in [KLC+00] for the special case of braid groups [Art47]. The authors used the conjugacy
problem of groups as their hard problem. However, Jun and Cheon presented in [CJ03] a polynomial
time algorithm for exactly their setup (but not for the conjugacy problem in general). This attack ex-
ploits the Lawrence-Krammer representation of braid groups [Kra02], which is a linear representation
of the braid group.
Concerning the task of finding commuting polynomials in the first Weyl algebra, a very thorough
study is presented in [BC23], which also demonstrates the hardness to find all commuting polynomials
in the ring of ordinary linear differential operators.
2 The Key Exchange Protocol
2.1 Description of the Protocol
We refer to our communicating parties as Alice (abbreviated A) and Bob (abbreviated B). Alice and
Bob wish to agree on a common secret key using a Diffie-Hellmann-like cryptosystem.
The main idea is similar to the key exchange protocol presented in [BGG+10]. The main differences
are that (i) the ring S and (ii) the commuting subsets are not fixed, but agreed upon as part of the
key-exchange protocol. It is summarized by the following algorithm.
Algorithm 1 DH-like protocol with rings of type (1)
1: A and B publicly agree on a ring S of type (1), a security parameter ν ∈ N representing the size of the
elements to be picked from S in terms of total degree and coefficients, a non-central element L ∈ S, and
two multiplicatively closed, commutative subsets of Cl, Cr ⊂ S, whose elements do not commute with L.
2: A chooses a tuple (PA, QA) ∈ Cl × Cr.
3: B chooses a tuple (PB , QB) ∈ Cl × Cr.
4: A sends the product Apart := PA · L ·QA to B.
5: B sends the product Bpart := PB · L ·QB to A.
6: A computes PA ·Bpart ·QA.
7: B computes PB ·Apart ·QB .
8: PA · PB · L ·QB ·QA = PB · PA · L ·QA ·QB is the shared secret key of A and B.
Proof (Correctness of Algorithm 1). As PA, PB ∈ Cl and QA, QB ∈ Cr, we have the identity in step
8. Therefore, by the end of the key exchange, both A and B are in possession of the same secret key.
Before discussing the complexity and security of the proposed scheme, we deal with the feasibility
of constructing the sets Cl, Cr in Algorithm 1. We propose the following technique, which is applicable
independent of the choice of S. Let P,Q ∈ S be chosen, such that they do not commute with L.
Define
Cl :=
{
f(P ) | f =
m∑
i=0
fiX
i ∈ R˜[X],m ∈ N, f0 6= 0
}
,
Cr :=
{
f(Q) | f =
m∑
i=0
fiX
i ∈ R˜[X],m ∈ N, f0 6= 0
}
, (3)
where R˜ is the subring of constants of S, and R˜[X] is the univariate commutative polynomial ring
over R˜. For an element f ∈ R˜[X], we let f(P ) denote the substitution of X in the terms of f by
P , and similarly f(Q) denotes the substitution of X by Q. By this construction, all the elements in
Cl commute, as do the elements in Cr. The choice of the coefficient f0 in both sets to be non-zero
is motivated by the following fact: If f0 is allowed to be zero, Eve could find that out by simply
trying to divide the resulting polynomial by P on the left (resp. by Q on the right). Moreover, Eve
could iterate this process for increasing indices, until an fi for i ∈ {0, . . . ,m} is reached, which is not
equal to zero. This could lead to a decrease of the amount of coefficients Eve has to figure out for
certain choices of keys. By the additional condition of having f0 6= 0, Eve cannot retrieve any further
information in the described way.
Using this technique, the first steps of Algorithm 1 can be altered in the following way. In step 1,
A and B agree upon two elements P,Q ∈ S, which represent Cl and Cr, respectively, as in (3). Then
each one of them chooses two random polynomials f, g in R˜[X], and obtains the tuple of secret keys
in steps 2 and 3 by computing f(P ) and g(Q). (Note that it could happen that one, or even both,
of f(P ), g(Q) commutes with L, even though neither P nor Q do so. This appears to be unlikely
in practice, but in any case, it is straightforward to deal with this possibility. A (resp. B) simply
checks if the chosen fA(P ) or gA(Q) (resp. fB(P ) or gB(Q)) commutes with L. If a commutation
with L should occur, say for A, A just chooses a new polynomial for fA(X) or gA(X). As P and Q
are chosen to not commute with L, A will quickly find polynomials fA(P ) and gA(Q) that do not
commute with L.)
Example 6. Let S be the third Weyl algebra A3 over the finite field F71, upon which A and B agree.
Let
L := 3x22 − 5∂22 − x2∂3 − x3 − ∂2,
P := −5x23 − 2x1∂3 + 34, and
Q := x22 + x1x3 − ∂23 + ∂3,
where L is the public polynomial as required in Algorithm 1, and P,Q, such that they define the sets
Cl and Cr as in (3).
Suppose A chooses polynomials fA(X) = 48X
2 + 22X + 27, gA(X) = 58X
2 + 5X + 52, while
B chooses fB(X) = 3X
2 + X + 31, gB(X) = 24X
2 + 4X + 11. Then the tuples are (PA, QA) =
(48P 2 + 22P + 27, 58Q2 + 5Q+ 52), and (PB , QB) = (3P
2 + P + 31, 24Q2 + 4Q+ 11).
As described in the protocol, A subsequently sends the product Apart := PA · L ·QA to B, while
B sends Bpart := PB ·L ·QB to A, and their secret key is PA ·PB ·L ·QB ·QA = PB ·PA ·L ·QA ·QB .
(For brevity, the final expanded product is not shown here.)
Remark 3. For practical purposes, the degree of L should be chosen to be of a sufficiently large degree
in order to perturb the product QB ·QA well enough before it is multiplied to PA ·PB . An examination
of the best choices for the degree of L is a subject of future work that includes practical applications
of our primitive for a Diffie-Hellman-like key exchange protocol.
Remark 4. As we will see in section 4, there are known insecure choices of keys for certain rings S.
Obviously, in a practical implementation, one has to check for these and avoid them.
2.2 Complexity of the Protocol
Of course, as our definition of the rings we consider in Algorithm 1 – namely rings of type (1) – is
chosen to be as general as possible, a complexity discussion is highly dependent on the choice of the
specific algebra. In practice, we envision that a certain finite subset of those algebras (such as, for
example, the Weyl algebras, or iterated extensions of the rings used in [BGG+10]) will be studied for
practical applications. Our complexity discussion here focusses rather on the general setup than on
concrete examples.
As we generally assume, all arithmetics in R, and therefore also in its subring of constants R˜, can
be computed in polynomial time. We suppose the same holds for the application of σi and δi, for
i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, to the elements of R, and that the time needed to choose a random element in R is
polynomial in the desired bit length of this random element. Thus, the choice of a random element in
S is just a finitely iterated application of the choice of coefficients, which lie in R. Let ωi(k) denote
the cost of applying σi (or δi, depending on which one of them is non-trivial) to an element f ∈ R of
bit-length k ∈ N. For two elements f, g ∈ R of bit-sizes k1, k2 ∈ N, we denote the cost of multiplying
them in R by θ(k1, k2), and the cost of adding them by ρ(k1, k2).
For the key exchange protocol the main cost that we need to address is the cost of multiplying two
polynomials in S. For a monomial m := ∂e11 · · · ∂enn , where e ∈ Nn0 , one can generalize Lemma 1 to the
multivariate case and find that multiplying m and f , where f has bit-size k, costs O(
∏n
i=1 ei · ωi(k))
bit-operations. For general polynomials in S, we obtain therefore the following property:
Lemma 2. Let n be the number of Ore extensions as in (1). For two polynomials h1, h2 ∈ S, let
d ∈ N0 be the maximal degree among the ∂i that appears in h1 and h2, and let k1, k2 ∈ N be the
maximal bit-length among the coefficients of h1 and h2, respectively. For notational convenience, we
define ζ :=
∏n
i=1 ωi(k2). Then the cost of computing the product h1 · h2 is in
O
(
d2n · ζ · θ(k1, ζ) · ρ(θ(k1, ζ), θ(k1, ζ))
)
.
Proof. We have at most dn terms in h1. When we multiply h1 and h2, we have to regard each term
separately, and compute the non-commutative relations. This results in the d2n different computa-
tions of size ζ. Then, for every one of those results, we need to apply a multiplication in R with
the coefficients of h1. In the end, the results of those multiplications have to be added together
appropriately, which results in the above complexity.
This lemma shows that multiplying two elements in S has polynomial time complexity in the size
of the elements, since the value of n is fixed for a chosen S.
Remark 5. The cost in Lemma 2 assumes the worst case, where each Ore extension of R has a non-
trivial δi. If for one of the extensions, δi is equal to the zero map, then the worst case complexity in
this variable is lower, as the term-wise multiplication does not result each time in a sum of different
terms in ∂i. One can see here, that in general, when the cost of the protocol is crucial for a resource-
limited practical implementation, one should prefer Ore extensions where δ is the zero map, i.e.
skew-polynomial rings.
2.3 Security Analysis
2.3.1 The Attacker’s Problem The security of our scheme relies on the difficulty of the following
problem, which is similar to the computational Diffie Hellman problem (CDH) [Mau94].
Given a ring S, a security parameter ν, two sets Cl, Cr of multiplicatively closed, commutative
subsets of S, whose elements do not commute with a certain given L ∈ S. Furthermore, let the
products PA · L ·QA and PB · L ·QB for some (PA, QA), (PB , QB) ∈ Cl × Cr also be known.
Difficult Problem (Ore Diffie Hellman (ODH)): Compute PB ·PA ·L ·QA ·QB (= PA ·PB ·L ·
QB ·QA) with the given information.
One way to solve this problem would be to recover one of the elements PA, QA, PB or QB . This
can be done via factoring PA ·L ·QA or PB ·L ·QB which appears, as mentioned in the introduction,
to be hard. Furthermore, even if one is able to factor an intercepted product, the factorization may
not be the correct one due to the non-uniqueness of the factorization in Ore extensions.
Another attack for the potential eavesdropper is to guess the degrees of (PA, QA) (or (PB , QB))
and to create an ansatz with the coefficients as unknowns, to form a system of multivariate polynomial
equations to solve. This type of attack and its infeasibility was discussed already in [BGG+10],
Section 5.2., and the argumentation of the authors translates analogously to our setup. Finally,
another attempt, which seems natural, is to generalize the attack of Dubois and Kammerer to the
multivariate setup. We will discuss such a possible generalization for certain rings of type (1) and
show that it is impractical in the following subsection.
We are not aware of any other way to obtain the common key of A and B while eavesdropping
on their communication channel in Algorithm 1 other than trying to recover the correct factorization
from the exchanged products of the form P · L ·Q.
Remark 6. Concerning the attack where Eve forms an ansatz and tries to solve multivariate polyno-
mial systems of equations: In fact, each element in our system has total degree at most two. There
exist attempts to improve the Gro¨bner computations for these kinds of systems [CKPS00, KS99],
but the assumptions are quite restrictive. Besides the assumption that the given ideal must be zero-
dimensional (which is only guaranteed in the case when the subring of constants is finite), there are
certain relations between the number of generators and variables necessary to apply these improve-
ments. We are not aware of any further progress on the techniques presented in [CKPS00, KS99]
since 2000, which have fewer restrictions on the system to be solved.
Remark 7. Note that there is a corresponding decision problem related to ODH: Given a candidate
for the final secret key, determine if this key is consistent with the public information exchanged by
Alice and Bob. To the best of our knowledge, this is also currently intractable.
2.3.2 Generalization of the attack by Dubois and Kammerer In this subsection, we assume
that our ring S is Noetherian, and that there exists a notion of a left or right Gro¨bner basis. Alice
and Bob have applied Algorithm 1 and their communication channel has been eavesdropped by Eve.
Now Eve knows about the chosen ring S, the commuting subsets Cl, Cr and the exchanged products
PA · L · QA and PB · L · QB for some (PA, QA), (PB , QB) ∈ Cl × Cr. Let us assume without loss of
generality that Eve wants to compute QA.
Eve does not have a way to compute greatest common right divisors, but she can utilize Gro¨bner
basis theory. For this, she picks a finite family {Ei}mi=1, m ∈ N, of elements in Cr. After that, she
computes the set G := {PA · L ·QA · Ei | i ∈ {1, . . . , n}}.
All elements in G (along with PA · L · QA) have QA as a right divisor in common, since Ei
commutes with QA for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. This means, the left ideal I in S generated by the elements
in G ∪ {PA · L ·QA} lies in – or is even equal to – the left ideal generated by QA. Hence, a Gro¨bner
basis computation of I might reveal QA. If not, a set of polynomials of possibly smaller degree than
the ones given in G that have QA as a right divisor will be the result of such a computation.
Besides having no guarantee that Eve obtains QA from the computations described above, the
computation of a Gro¨bner basis is an exponential space hard problem [MM82]. We tried to attack
our protocol using this idea. We chose the second Weyl algebra as a possible ring, as there is a notion
of a Gro¨bner basis and there are implementations available. It turned out that our computer ran
out of memory after days of computation on several examples where L, QA, QB , PA and PB each
exceed a total degree of ten. For practical choices, of course, one must choose degrees which are
higher (dependent on the choice of the ring S). Hence, we consider our proposal secure from this
generalization of the attack by Dubois and Kammerer.
2.3.3 Recommended Key Lengths The question of recommended key lengths has to be dis-
cussed for each ring of type (1) separately. With lengths, one means in the context of this paper the
degree of the chosen public polynomials L, P and Q in the ∂i for i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and the size of their
respective coefficients in R. We cannot state a general recommendation for key-lengths that lead to
secure keys for arbitrary choices of S. For the Weyl algebra, where some implementations of factoring
algorithms are available, we could observe through experiments that generic choices of P and Q in Cl
and Cr, respectively, each of total degree 20, lead to products P ·L ·Q which cannot be factored after
a feasible amount of time. If one chooses our approach (3) to find commuting elements, the choice
of the degree of the polynomials in R˜[X] is the critical part, and the polynomials P and Q – as they
are publicly known – can be chosen to be of small degree for performance’s sake.
In general, for efficiency, we recommend choosing n = 2 for the ring S, as it already ensures that
S is not a principal ideal domain and keeps multiplication costs low.
For the case where our underlying ring is a finite field, we are able to present in Table 1 a more
detailed cost estimate on the hardness to attack our protocol by using brute-force. There, we assume
that R = Fq, where q = pk for a prime p and k > 2. For efficiency, as outlined above, we pick n = 2
and further k = 3. Then we define S as being R[∂1;σ1][∂2;σ2], where σ1, σ2 are different powers of the
Frobenius automorphism on Fq. We assume that the polynomials are stored in dense representation
in memory. The two commuting subsets Cl, Cr are defined as in (3). We will measure the time in
computation steps. We assume that any arithmetic operation on Fq, as well as the application of σ1
resp. σ2, takes one step. Then, the cost formula as presented in Lemma 2 will be in the worst case
d4 ·2, as addition and multiplication are assumed to take one computation step, and ζ ≤ 3 (due to the
automorphism group of R having order 3). The security parameter is given as a tuple (dL, dPQ, ν),
where dL is the total degree of L, dPQ is the total degree of each of P and Q, and ν is the maximal
degree of the polynomials in Fp[X] chosen to compute each of PA, PB , QA and QB . To simplify the
analysis, we assume for our estimates that the degree in each ∂1 and ∂2 will be half of the total degree
for L,P and Q. As for the cost of Alice resp. Bob to compute the messages they are sending, and to
compute the final key, we used the following formulas to make a prudent estimation:
– Computing all powers of P and Q: The cost c(ν) to compute all these powers up to a certain
exponent ν can be estimated by the following recursive formula:
c(1) = 0, (P or Q are given, no need to compute)
c(j + 1) =
(j · dPQ)4
8
+ c(j).
As a closed formula, we can we can write it as
c(ν) =
ν∑
j=0
(j · dPQ)4
8
=
d4PQ
8
·
ν∑
j=0
j4 =
d4PQ
8
·
(
5 · (ν + 1)5 − 1
2
· (ν + 1)4 + 1
3
· (ν + 1)3 − 1
30
· ν − 1
30
)
.
– Generating private polynomials: Both Alice and Bob have to compute PA and QA resp. PB
and QB . In order to do so, each power of P and Q has to be computed and multiplied by an
element in Fp, which results in
2 ·
ν∑
j=0
j2 · d2PQ
4
=
ν∑
j=0
j2 · d2PQ
2
=
d2PQ
2
· 3 ·
(
(ν + 1)3 − 1
2
· (ν + 1)2 + 1
6
· ν + 1
6
)
operations. Adding all these together adds another 2 · ν
2·d2PQ
4 operations for Alice resp. Bob.
– Computing initial message: We assume that we have the private polynomials for A and B
already computed, and their respective degree is dPQ · ν. Then, in order to compute the initial
message, we need
(dPQ·ν)4
8 steps to compute PA · L, assuming that the degree of L is smaller.
Afterwards, to obtain PA · L ·QA, we have to do (dPQ·ν+
dL
2 )
4
8 additional steps.
– Computing the shared secret key: The shared secret takes then
(2·dPQ·ν+dL/2)4
8 +
(3·dPQ·ν+dL/2)4
8
steps to compute by directly applying the cost estimate for multiplication.
The worst case for the size in bits of the shared key in the end can be estimated by adding the degrees
of the computed L, PA, QA, QB and PB together. This results in the formula(
dL + 8 · ν · dPQ
2
)2
· dlog(p)e,
where we assume that the partial degree in ∂1 and ∂2 is about half of the total degree of the final
polynomial. In practice, one would probably prefer to use a sparse representation, which would on
average lead to smaller final key sizes.
As for the cost for an attacker to do a brute-force attack, i.e. trying to determine the shared secret
of Alice and Bob, we assume that an attacker would try all possibilities for one of the polynomials
PA, PB , QA or QB and check, for each possibility, if the computed polynomial divides one of the
messages between Alice and Bob. Hence, for every possibility, Eve must solve a linear system of
equations of size d2m, where dm is the maximal total degree of one of the messages (usually 2 · ν ·
dPQ + dL). I.e. there arise (
dm
2 )
2ω additional computation steps for each possibility, where ω is the
matrix multiplication constant (currently ω ≈ 2.373). Initially, the attacker has to also compute all
powers of P resp. Q, and then the additions, as listed above. The following table lists our computed
costs for different security parameters.
Security Tuple
Computation Costs for Alice and Bob Final Key
Size in KB
Brute-Force
CostSecret Parameter Initial Message Shared Secret
(30, 5, 10) 1.247955E + 08 3.012579E + 06 1.145127E + 08 46 2.066009E + 16
(30, 5, 15) 8.144450E + 08 1.215633E + 07 5.073701E + 08 97 9.616857E + 18
(30, 5, 20) 3.176336E + 09 3.436258E + 07 1.497794E + 09 169 2.237607E + 21
(30, 5, 25) 9.248193E + 09 7.853758E + 07 3.508245E + 09 260 3.467317E + 23
(30, 5, 30) 2.229704E + 10 1.559313E + 08 7.074856E + 09 370 4.110897E + 25
(50, 5, 35) 4.711215E + 10 3.172363E + 08 1.391021E + 10 514 5.144021E + 27
(50, 5, 40) 9.029806E + 10 5.203613E + 08 2.315166E + 10 665 4.258507E + 29
(50, 5, 45) 1.605675E + 11 8.086426E + 08 3.637583E + 10 836 3.176783E + 31
(50, 5, 50) 2.690343E + 11 1.203174E + 09 5.458994E + 10 1027 2.179949E + 33
Table 1. Computation costs (given as number of primitive computation steps) for Alice and Bob to perform
Algorithm 1 with R = Fq, p = 2 and S = R[∂1;σ1][∂2;σ2] and costs for Eve to perform a brute-force attack.
Remark 8. We tried to factor the exchanged products PA · L · QA and PA · L · QB from the small
Example 6 in section 2.1 using Singular and REDUCE, and it turned out that both were not
able to provide us with one factorization after 48 hours of computation on an iMac with 2.8Ghz (4
cores) and 8GB RAM available. This means that even for rather small choices of keys, the recovery
of P and Q via factoring appears already to be hard using available tools. Of course, for this small
key-choice, a brute-force ansatz attack (as described above in Remark 6) would succeed fairly quickly.
We also tried 150 examples with different degrees for P,Q,L and the respective polynomials in Cl
and Cr. In particular, we let the degree of L range from 5 to degree 50, the degree of P and Q
respectively between 5 and 10, and the degrees of the elements in Cl and Cr — which are created
with the help of P and Q – are having degrees ranging between 25 and 50. We gave each factorization
process a time limit of 4 hours to be finished. None of the polynomials has been factored within that
time-frame. The examples can be downloaded from the following website: https://cs.uwaterloo.
ca/~aheinle/software_projects.html.
2.3.4 Attacks On Similar Systems Here, we discuss why known attacks on protocols similar
to Algorithm 1 do not apply to our contexts.
As emphasized before, the attack developed by Dubois and Kammerer on the protocol by Boucher
et al. is prevented by choosing rings that are not principal ideal domains. Thus, there is no general
algorithmic way to compute greatest common right divisors.
When applying the rings S of type (1) to exchange keys, one does in fact not utilize the whole
ring structure, but only the multiplicative monoid structure. Therefore it appears to be reasonable to
consider also attacks developed for protocols based on non-abelian groups (albeit they contain more
structure than just monoids, the latter being the correct description of our setup). The most famous
protocol is given by Ko et al., as discussed in the section on related work. The attack developed
by Jun and Cheon exploits the fact that braid groups are linear. However, there is currently no
linear representation known for our rings of type (1) (though it would be an interesting subject of
future research), so there is at present no analogous attack on protocols based on our primitive.
Furthermore, even if a linear representation for our rings were discovered, it is not clear whether Jun
and Cheon’s attack could be extended to our case, as the authors make use of invertible elements in
their algorithm (which our structures, only being monoids, do not possess).
3 Implementation and Experiments
We developed an experimental implementation of the key exchange protocol as presented in Algorithm
1 in the programming language C1. We decided to develop such a low-level implementation after
we found that commodity computer algebra systems appear to be too slow to make experiments
with reasonably large elements. This may be due to the fact that their implemented algorithms are
designed to be generally applicable to several classes of rings and therefore come with a large amount
of computational overhead. Our goal is to examine key-lengths and the time it takes for computing
the secret keys. It is to be emphasized that our code leaves considerable room for improvement.
For the implementation, we chose our ring S to have the form as described in Example 3. In
particular, our ring for the coefficients R is set to F125, and we fixed n := 2. Internally, we view
F125 isomorphically as F5(α) := F5[x]/〈x3 + 3x + 3〉. Our non-commutative polynomial ring S is
1 One can download the implementation at https://github.com/ioah86/diffieHellmanNonCommutative
R[∂1;σ1][∂2;σ2], where
σ1 : F5(α)→ F5(α), a0 + a1α+ a2α2 7→ a0 + a1 + a2 + 3a2α+ (3a1 + 4a2)α2
σ2 : F5(α)→ F5(α), a0 + a1α+ a2α2 7→ a0 + 4a1 + 3a2 + (4a1 + 2a2)α+ 2a1α2.
The ring of constants is therefore R˜ := F5 ⊂ R. These two automorphisms are given by different
powers of the Frobenius automorphism, and they are the only two distinct non-trivial automorphisms
on F5(α) (cf. [Gar86, Theorem 12.4]).
Note, that the multiplication of two elements f and g in this ring requires O(n4) integer multi-
plications, where n = max{deg(f),deg(g)}.
Following the notation as in Algorithm 1, our implementation generates random polynomials L,
P and Q in S. Our element L is chosen to have total degree 50, and P , Q each have total degree 5.
Afterwards, it generates four polynomials in R˜[X] to obtain (PA, QA), (PB , QB) in the fashion of (3).
Subsequently, the program computes the products PA · L · QA, PB · L · QB and the secret key
PA ·PB ·L ·QB ·QA = PB ·PA ·L ·QA ·QB . Naturally, some of those computations would be performed
in parallel when the protocol is applied, but we did not incorporate parallelism into our experimental
setup. At runtime, all computed values are printed out to the user.
We experimented with different degrees for the polynomials in R˜[X] to generate the private keys,
namely 10, 20, 30, 40 and 50. This leads to respectively 20, 40, 60, 80 and 100 indeterminates for
Eve to solve for if she eavesdrops the channel between Alice and Bob and tries to attack the protocol
using an ansatz by viewing the coefficients as unknown parameters. Even if she decides to attack the
protocol using brute-force, she has to go through 510, 520, 530, 540 and 550 possibilities respectively
(note here, that for a brute-force attack, Eve only needs to extract a right or left hand factor of the
products PA · L · QA and PB · L · QB that Bob and Alice exchange). The file sizes and the timings
for the experiments are illustrated in Figure 1.
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Fig. 1. Timings and file sizes for different degrees of elements in R˜[X]
Note, that the file sizes are not indicative of the actual bit-size of the keys, as the files we produced
are made to be human-readable. Allowing for this fact, the bit-sizes of our keys are comparable to
those found necessary for secure implementations of the McEliece cryptosystem [McE78, BLP08],
which is a well-studied post-quantum encryption scheme.
In our experimental setup, we can see that one can generate a reasonably secure key (degree
30 for the elements in R˜[X]) in less than five minutes at the current stage of the implementation.
For larger degrees, we believe that machine-optimized code would decrease the computation time
significantly. An interesting question is whether arithmetics in our class of non-commutative rings
can be implemented in a smart way on a quantum computer.
3.1 Challenge Problems
For readers who would like to try to attack the keys generated by this particular implementation,
we have generated a set of challenge problems. They can be found, with description, on the website
of one of the authors (https://cs.uwaterloo.ca/~aheinle/miscellaneous.html#challenges).
There are also challenges included for the three-pass protocol as described in section 5.1.
4 Insecure Keys
In this section, we will present an insecure key-choice for the Weyl algebras. The construction of those
insecure keys, which is related to finding commutative subrings, can be applied to other algebras of
type (1).
4.1 Insecure Keys for the Weyl Algebras
4.1.1 Graded Polynomials. Based on the paper [GHL14], there is a large subset of the polyno-
mial nth Weyl algebra, where the factorization problem of their elements can be reduced to factoring
in a commutative, multivariate polynomial ring.
In particular, there exists a non-trivial Zn-grading on the polynomial nth Weyl algebra, where
the zth graded part, for z ∈ Zn, can be characterized in the following way:
A(z)n :=

∑
e,w∈Nn0
w−e=z
rew · xe11 · · ·xenn · ∂w11 · · · ∂wnn | rew ∈ K˜
 .
We call an element h in the polynomial nth Weyl algebra graded, if h ∈ A(z)n for some z ∈ Zn.
These graded polynomials are exactly the ones for which the factorization problem can be reduced
to commutative factorization as mentioned above.
Now, there are two possible scenarios for weak key choices of A and B. Let L be the public key,
and PA, QA and PB , QB be the private keys of A and B respectively, i.e. the final key of A and B is
PA · PB · L ·QB ·QA. The first scenario is that all of the keys that A and B use are graded. Then a
possible eavesdropper E can recover the private keys by factoring PA ·L ·QA and PB ·L ·QB , applying
techniques presented by [GHL14]. The second scenario is that one of the private keys of PA, PB , QA
and QB is graded. Without loss of generality, let PA be graded. Then E can recover PA by factoring
every graded summand of PA ·L ·QA, and therefore E can also recover QA and the security is broken.
Fortunately, A and B can check their keys for being graded in polynomial time. In particular,
for an element h the polynomial nth Weyl algebra, one has to check if for every i ∈ {1, . . . , n} the
difference of the exponents of xi and ∂i is the same in every term of h. This is the case if and only if
h is graded.
Remark 9. One can argue that the Weyl algebras as we define them assume that the xi are units,
and therefore the attack as described here is not possible once we choose for our keys coefficients
that have in the denominator some nontrivial polynomial in the xi. But there is a possibility to lift
factorizations into the polynomial Weyl algebra, which is described in [GHL14]. Thus one has to lift
the keys and double check for them being graded or not. This check obviously still requires only
polynomial time.
Generally, as we can see here, one should study the concrete ring of type (1) chosen for Algorithm 1,
in order to determine in which cases factorization can be reduced to an easy problem in commutative
algebra, and avoid those cases for the key-choice. The construction of the insecure keys in the case
of the Weyl algebra as presented here gives an idea how to find commutative subrings and how to
avoid them.
5 Enhancements
In what follows, we show that the use of multivariate Ore polynomials is not limited to the Diffie-
Hellman-like protocol discussed and analyzed in the previous sections, but can also be utilized to
develop other cryptographic applications.
It should be noted that two of the protocols described below, namely the digital signature scheme
and the zero-knowledge-proof protocol, do not require the use of commuting subsets, which reduces
the necessary amount of public information to be exchanged between Alice and Bob.
5.1 The Three-pass Protocol and private L
As we saw in Algorithm 1, Alice and Bob must make inter alia the following information public at
the start: Cl, Cr, and L. If we can find a way to make any of these objects private between Alice and
Bob, the security of the system may be increased.
One possible method to make L private is based on a well-known puzzle, known variously as the
Locks and Boxes, the Knight and the Princess, and perhaps other names. In this puzzle, Alice wishes
to send Bob an item in a securely locked box. Both have a supply of locks and keys to the locks,
which they could use to lock the box. However, neither Alice nor Bob have keys to the other party’s
locks. So if Alice sends the item to Bob in a locked box, he will be unable to open it. Furthermore,
it does no good to send an unopened lock or a key to the other party to use, as it would simply be
stolen, or the key copied, negating any security.
The solution is for Alice to first send Bob the item in a box, sealed with one of her own locks.
Bob cannot open Alice’s lock, but he can add one of his own locks to the box (so it has now has two
locks on it) and return it to Alice. Alice then removes her lock, and sends the box a second time to
Bob. Finally, Bob removes his lock, and opens the box.
We use this idea in the following protocol, for Alice to send a secret choice of L to Bob.
Algorithm 2 Three-pass exchange protocol with rings of type (1)
1: A and B publicly agree on a ring S of type (1), and two multiplicatively closed, commutative subsets
Cl, Cr ⊂ S.
2: A chooses a secret L ∈ S, which is not central in Cl and Cr, that she wants to share with B.
3: A picks random polynomials PA ∈ Cl and QA ∈ Cr, which form her private tuple (PA, QA). If coinciden-
tally either PA or QA commute with L, A must choose a different pair PA, QA.
4: A computes the product PA · L ·QA, and sends it to B.
5: B picks random polynomials PB ∈ Cl and QB ∈ Cr, which form his private tuple (PB , QB).
6: B computes the intermediate product Pint = PB · PA · L ·QA ·QB(= PA · PB · L ·QB ·QA) and sends it
to A.
7: A divides Pint on the right by QA, and on the left by PA. A sends the result, PB · L ·QB , to B.
8: B divides PB · L ·QB on the right by QB , and on the left by PB , to recover the secret L.
Remark 10. With L secretly agreed upon, Alice and Bob may now use Algorithm 1 to agree upon
a secret key, with only the commuting elements from Cl and Cr being public. Note that they may
choose a new set of tuples (PA, QA), (PB , QB), and indeed, may even publicly agree on a new choice
of Cl and Cr for Algorithm 1. In this way, the information exchanged during Algorithm 2 cannot help
the eavesdropper to know the (PA, QA) and (PB , QB) used in Algorithm 1.
Remark 11. Naturally, Algorithm 2 can be used as a key exchange protocol by itself, where L is the
key being exchanged. Deciding which approach would be better in a given situation would require
further investigation. However, there is an advantage in defending against the attack where Eve forms
an ansatz and tries to solve non-linear systems of equations: Eve would deal with tertiary systems of
equations (instead of quadratic ones) in this case, as the coefficients of L are also unknown.
Remark 12. Regarding the requirement, at various points in Algorithm 2, that elements must not
commute: If the elements did commute, we actually do not know of any attacks that would take
advantage of this property. So these requirements may be unnecessary. However, in general terms,
commuting algebraic objects are often easier to analyze than non-commuting ones, and might be
easier to attack. Prudence therefore suggests that we choose non-commuting elements as much as
possible, allowing commutativity only where it is needed by the protocol in order to function properly.
The security assumption here differs slightly from the one for Algorithm 1. Here, Eve is given Cl,
Cr, PA · L ·QA, PB · PA · L ·QA ·QB and PB · L ·QB .
Difficult Problem (Ore Three Pass Protocol (OTPP)): Determine L with the given informa-
tion.
As is the case for the Diffie-Hellman-like protocol, the ability to feasibly compute all factorizations of
elements in S would of course allow Eve to determine Alice’s secret. But this is a hard problem with
currently known methods, as mentioned in the introduction. We are not aware of any other feasible
way to obtain L.
Remark 13. Similarly to ODH, there is also a corresponding decision problem related to OTPP:
Given a candidate for the final secret L, determine if L is consistent with the public information
exchanged by Alice and Bob. To the best of our knowledge, this is also currently intractable.
5.2 ElGamal-like Encryption and Signature Schemes
In 1984, ElGamal showed that a cryptosystem and digital signature scheme were possible using ex-
ponentiation in finite fields [ElG85]. Here, we will show that such schemes are also possible using
non-commutative polynomial rings. There will necessarily be some differences between our schemes
and those of ElGamal, since finite fields are commutative and all (non-zero) elements are invert-
ible, whereas our structures are non-commutative and the elements are non-invertible. Nevertheless,
approaches very similar to those of ElGamal can be developed.
5.2.1 An ElGamal-like Encryption Scheme Suppose Bob wishes to send a secret message
to Alice. An inconvenience of the Diffie-Hellman-like protocols is that Bob must wait for Alice to
respond before the key is decided. Only then can Bob encrypt and send his message.
It would be desirable to have a scheme whereby Bob, or anyone else, can send an encrypted mes-
sage to Alice whenever they wish, without the need to wait for Alice to respond. This is possible, as
we now show, but it requires Alice to precompute and publish some information. It should be noted
that the following encryption scheme is only intended to provide a basic level of security (i.e. an eaves-
dropper who intercepts the ciphertext is not able to compute the corresponding plaintext). Further
enhancements to the scheme are required for stronger notions of security (e.g. indistinguishability
against adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks).
Preparation: Alice chooses L ∈ S, and two multiplicatively closed, commutative subsets Cl, Cr ⊂ S.
Then she picks random polynomials PA ∈ Cl and QA ∈ Cr, which form her private tuple (PA, QA).
If coincidentally either PA or QA commute with L, Alice must choose a different pair PA, QA. Alice
publishes L, Cl, Cr, and PAlice := PA · L ·QA. The tuple (PA, QA) is kept secret.
Encryption: Let m ∈ S be a message which Bob wishes to encrypt before sending to Alice. (We
assume that a plaintext message has already been mapped to Ore polynomial form, so m ∈ S.)
Bob picks random polynomials PB ∈ Cl and QB ∈ Cr, which form his private tuple (PB , QB). Again,
Bob ensures that PB , QB and L are pairwise non-commutative.
Bob computes PBob := PB · L · QB and Pfinal := PB · PAlice · QB , and encrypts the message as
me := m · Pfinal. Bob then sends the pair (me, PBob) to Alice.
Decryption: Given (me, PBob), Alice first computes Pfinal = PA · PBob ·QA. She then divides me(=
m · Pfinal) on the right by Pfinal to recover m.
Correctness: The correctness depends on Alice computing the same Pfinal as Bob. But this will be
true because PA, PB commute, as do QA, QB , so PB · PAlice ·QB = PA · PBob ·QA.
Security: Comparing this scheme with Algorithm 1, it is clear that PAlice is the product sent from
Alice to Bob, PBob the product from Bob to Alice, and Pfinal is the shared final key that is agreed
upon. In addition to knowing these exchanged values, Eve will also know the encrypted message me.
So the security is essentially the same as that of Algorithm 1, except for an additional assumption,
that the attacker will find it difficult to factor me := m · Pfinal.
Remark 14. As ElGamal observes, the multiplication me := m · Pfinal in the encryption step could
be replaced by any invertible operation, e.g., by addition. Indeed, setting me := m + Pfinal gives
essentially the encryption scheme proposed by Boucher et al. [BGG+10]. This has the advantage of
being easier to compute, and giving an encrypted me of smaller size than one that uses multiplication.
We would caution, however, that for such a scheme to be secure, both m and Pfinal should probably
be dense polynomials. If one polynomial is dense but the other sparse, for example, much of the
structure of the dense polynomial would be visible in me, and could aid an attacker.
Remark 15. The message encryption step (i.e. computing me = m · Pfinal) is not required to be
performed inside S. In fact, Pfinal is the key with which Bob encrypts the message m, and the
algorithm that is used for this step can be replaced by any known and well-studied private key
system, such as AES [DR02]. In this case, the security of our protocol reduces to the security of our
Algorithm 1, along with the security of the chosen private key system.
5.2.2 An ElGamal-like Digital Signature Scheme Suppose Alice wishes to prove to Bob that
a message she is sending him did, in fact, come from her. For his part, Bob may want this proof, both
as a guard against forgers, and also to prevent Alice from denying at a later time that the message
had come from her. The digital signature scheme shown below is intended to accomplish this. (Note
that a message m need not be encrypted to be signed; Alice may also use her signature to show
that she publicly approves of a cleartext message.) As in the encryption scheme in section 5.2.1, this
requires Alice to precompute and publish information at some location, e.g., a secure webpage. This
must be securely associated with her, both to prevent forgers from altering the information, and to
prevent her from trying to repudiate any messages bearing her digital signature. Again, as in section
5.2.1, our proposed signature scheme is only intended to provide a basic level of security (i.e. Eve
cannot forge Alice’s signature on an arbitrary message of Eve’s choice). Further enhancements are
needed for stronger notions of security.
Preparation: Alice chooses a1, L, a2 ∈ S, pairwise non-commutative. Alice publishes L and PAlice :=
a1 · L · a2. The tuple (a1, a2) is kept secret.
Signature Creation: Let m ∈ S be a message which Alice wishes to sign. (m may be either
encrypted or unencrypted.)
Alice chooses two new random polynomials k1, k2 ∈ S. (Alice checks that L, k1, k2 are pairwise
non-commutative.) Alice computes γ := k1 · L · k2, 1 := k1 · L · a2, and 2 := a1 · L · k2. The tuple
(k1, k2) is kept secret.
Now Alice chooses q1 ∈ S and computes r1 := m− γa1 − q1k1 ∈ S, so that:
m− γa1 = q1k1 + r1. (4)
Analogously, Alice also chooses q2 ∈ S and computes r2 := m− a2γ − k2q2 ∈ S, so that:
m− a2γ = k2q2 + r2. (5)
Alice sends Bob the signed message m as the 8-tuple (m, γ, q1, r1, q2, r2, 1, 2). Note that k1, k2, a1,
a2 are all kept secret by Alice.
Signature Verification: Given (m, γ, q1, r1, q2, r2, 1, 2), (and the public L and PAlice), Bob com-
putes:
sigleft := (m− r1) · L · (m− r2) ,
sigright := q1γq2 + q11γ + γ2q2 + γPAliceγ.
(6)
If sigleft = sigright, then the signature is accepted as valid. Otherwise, the signature is rejected.
Correctness: We have
sigleft = (m− r1) · L · (m− r2)
= (q1k1 + γa1) · L · (k2q2 + a2γ) , using (4), (5)
= q1k1Lk2q2 + q1k1La2γ + γa1Lk2q2 + γa1La2γ
= q1γq2 + q11γ + γ2q2 + γPAliceγ
= sigright,
using k1Lk2 = γ, k1La2 = 1, a1Lk2 = 2, and a1La2 = PAlice.
Security: To forge a signature for a given message m, Eve must find values of γ, q1, r1, q2, r2, 1,
2 which result in sigleft = sigright. We cannot see any easy way to do this. She can, of course, choose
her own values of k1, k2, and compute a corresponding γ = k1Lk2. This is, indeed, a plausible value
for γ, since Alice could have chosen these values for k1, k2 herself. But Eve does not have the values
of a1 and a2. If she guesses them, as say a˜1, a˜2, then eventually she will fail to form PAlice correctly
when the product a˜1La˜2 is formed in the correctness proof above, and will not have sigleft = sigright.
Furthermore, given a legitimate signature from Alice, it appears doubtful that an attacker can
recover a1 and a2. For example, from (4), we have m− r1 = q1k1 + γa1. Here, the left side is known,
as are q1 and γ on the right. But we know no way of determining k1 and a1, other than computing
the syzygy-module M ∈ S3 of q1, γ, and m − r1 and considering the subset {` = [`1, `2, `3] ∈ M |
`3 = −1} ⊆M . As this is in general an infinite set, this does not yield a practical way of recovering
k1 and a1.
It will be noted, however, that computing a signature may result in very large expressions. Thus,
(m− r1) ·L · (m− r2) is likely to be much larger than the message m itself. However, in practice, one
would only create a signature on a certain hash-sum of the message m, which has fixed length for all
possible messages.
5.3 A Zero Knowledge Proof Protocol Using Multivariate Ore Polynomials
As usual, let S := R[∂1;σ1, δ1][∂2;σ2, δ2] . . . [∂n;σn, δn], for some fixed n ≥ 2. Let L ∈ S. Suppose
Alice knows a factorization (possibly partial) of L into two nontrivial factors `1 and `2. That is,
L = `1 · `2, where L, `1, `2 ∈ S. (By nontrivial, we mean that for at least one i, where 1 ≤ i ≤ n, we
have deg∂i(`1) ≥ 1, and similarly for `2. Furthermore, the factorization may only be partial, i.e., `1 or
`2 may themselves factor over S. But we will not be concerned here with this possibility.) Note that
as we are assuming that factorization of multivariate Ore polynomials is, in general, computationally
infeasible, Alice may well have accomplished her feat by first choosing `1 and `2, then creating a
suitable L by computing L = `1 · `2, and then finally publishing L. But the particular method she
used to produce an L and its factors is not important to the protocol.
Bob also knows L, but does not know `1 or `2. Alice wishes to convince Bob, beyond any reasonable
doubt, that she knows a factorization of L. But she does not wish to tell Bob her factors `1 or `2,
or to give Bob enough information that would allow him to compute the factors within any feasible
time. We have, therefore, a situation which calls for a zero knowledge proof protocol.
Alice can do this using the following protocol, which is repeated as many times as Bob desires,
until he is convinced that Alice does, indeed, possess a factorization of L:
Step 1: Alice chooses two polynomials p1, p2 ∈ S, and forms the product pi := p1 · L · p2. She sends
pi to Bob. She also tells Bob the degrees of p1 and p2 in each of the ∂i. That is, for each i, where
1 ≤ i ≤ n, she sends Bob deg∂i(p1) and deg∂i(p2). Apart from this information, however, Alice keeps
p1 and p2 private, unless Bob specifically asks for them in Step 2.
Note that pi = p1 · L · p2 = p1 · `1`2 · p2 = pi1 · pi2, where we define pi1 := p1`1, and pi2 := `2p2.
Thus, two different partial factorizations of pi are pi = p1 · L · p2 and pi = pi1 · pi2. Essentially, in Step
2., Bob may ask Alice for one, and only one, of these two factorizations.
Step 2: Having received pi and the degree information for p1 and p2 from Alice, Bob asks Alice for
exactly one of the following: Either (i) p1 and p2, or (ii) pi1 and pi2.
Step 2a: If Bob asked for p1 and p2, he checks that pi = p1 · L · p2. He also checks that p1 and p2
satisfy the degree bounds sent earlier by Alice in Step 1.
Step 2b: If Bob asked for pi1 and pi2, he checks that pi = pi1 ·pi2. He also checks that pi1 and pi2 satisfy
the following degree conditions: For each i, where 1 ≤ i ≤ n, he requires that deg∂i(pi1) ≥ deg∂i(p1).
Furthermore, for at least one j, 1 ≤ j ≤ n, the inequality must be strict, i.e., deg∂j (pi1) > deg∂j (p1).
Likewise, pi2 must satisfy deg∂i(pi2) ≥ deg∂i(p2) for all i, where 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and for at least one k,
where 1 ≤ k ≤ n, must satisfy deg∂k(pi2) > deg∂k(p2).
If any of these checks fail, then the protocol terminates, and Bob rejects Alice’s claim to know a
nontrivial factorization of L. If the checks hold true, then Alice has passed this cycle of the protocol.
Steps 1. through 2b. constitute one cycle of the protocol. For each cycle, Alice chooses a new pair of
polynomials p1, p2 in Step 1., never using the same polynomial more than once. The cycle is repeated
until either one of the checks fail, or until Bob is convinced, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Alice
does indeed posses a nontrivial factorization of L.
Discussion and Security of the Protocol: For each cycle of the protocol, Bob can randomly
choose whether to ask Alice for p1, p2, or for pi1, pi2. Suppose this is repeated many times, with the
answers always satisfying the checks. Then Bob should eventually be convinced, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that for any pi offered by Alice in Step 1., she is always able to factor pi both as p1Lp2 and as
pi1pi2, with the degree conditions also satisfied.
The two questions we must address are: (i) should Bob believe that Alice knows some nontrivial
factorization `1`2 of L?; and (ii) do Alice’s answers to Bob’s queries give Bob a practical method to
determine a nontrivial factorization of L?
(i) Alice can factor L:
First, consider the requirement that Alice must give degree conditions on p1, p2 in Step 1., before
Bob says whether he wishes to know p1, p2, or pi1, pi2 in Step 2. If we did not impose this condition
on Alice, she could trick Bob into believing that she had a factorization of L as follows. First, instead
of a p1, she chooses p
′
1, p
′′
1 , p2 ∈ S, and computes pi := p′1 · p′′1 · L · p2, sending only pi to Bob. Now, if
Bob asks for p1, p2, she sends him p1 := p
′
1p
′′
1 , and p2. He then computes p1 · L · p2, and finds this
product to equal pi, as expected. On the other hand, if he asks for pi1, pi2, Alice sends him pi1 := p
′
1,
pi2 := p
′′
1Lp2. Again, Bob will find that pi1 · pi2 yields pi, as expected. So Alice appears to have passed
the test, even though she needed no knowledge of any factorization of L.
Forcing Alice to give the degree conditions in Step 1., before Bob announces his choice in Step 2.,
prevents Alice from using this strategy to deceive Bob. Furthermore, the degree conditions on pi1 and
pi2, if Bob should ask for these two polynomials, prevents Alice from simply setting either pi1 := p1,
pi2 := Lp2, or pi1 := p1L, pi2 := p2, neither of which would have required any knowledge of the factors
of L. Informally, the degree conditions force both pi1 and pi2 to partially ”overlap” L in the product
pi.
Now, the above might appear to imply that pi1 and pi2 must have the forms pi1 = p1`1, pi2 = `2p2.
However, factorization in S is unique only up to similarity (cf. Section 1.1, Definition 4). Consequently,
it is possible that Alice has found p1, p2, pi1, pi2, such that p1Lp2 = pi1pi2 (which she sets equal to pi),
and yet p1 is not a left divisor of pi1, nor is p2 a right divisor of pi2. With such a choice of polynomials,
Alice would be able to satisfy the demands of the protocol, without necessarily having any knowledge
of the factors of L. However, finding such a set of polynomials is, as far as we know, computationally
impractical with currently known methods. The only reasonable conclusion for Bob, therefore, is that
pi1 = p1`1, pi2 = `2p2.
However, if Alice knows both pi1 and p1, she can simply perform exact division of pi1 on the left
by p1 to obtain `1. Similarly, (exactly) dividing pi2 on the right by p2 will yield `2. Hence Bob must
conclude that Alice does, indeed, know some nontrivial factorization `1`2 of L.
(ii) Bob cannot factor L:
Again, let us first consider the effect that knowing the degrees of p1 and p2 will have on Bob’s
attempts to find a factorization of L. Certainly, this knowledge makes it easier for him to set up an
ansatz, e.g., of the form pi = p1`1`2p2. However, even if Bob did not know these degree conditions, the
number of possibilities he would have to consider would increase only by a factor that is polynomial in
n and the maximum degree in any ∂i of pi. That is, if Bob could find some factors of L in polynomial
time by some algorithm which makes use of the given degree conditions, he could also find the
factors in polynomial time without knowing these conditions. Thus, these degree conditions do not,
in themselves, compromise the security of the protocol.
Now, Bob obtains two sorts of information from Alice. The first is p1 and p2 such that pi = p1Lp2.
Clearly, this does not help Bob to factor L, since he could just as well have chosen his own p1 and
p2, computed the product p1Lp2 to form his own pi, and done so as many times as he wished. Such
queries, therefore, do not lead to any exploitable weakness.
The second type of query gives Bob pi1 and pi2 such that pi = pi1pi2. Let us first consider pi1 (the
situation for pi2 is similar): Bob knows that pi1 = p1`1, though of course p1 and `1 are unknown to
him. Bob also knows L, though again its factors `1, `2 are also unknown to him. Hence one type
of attack would be to use the fact that `1 is a right divisor of pi1, and also a left divisor of L. It is
interesting to note, however, that even in (non-commutative) Euclidean domains, there is currently
no known practical algorithm to find such a left and right simultaneous divisor. Our domain S is not
even Euclidean, so the situation is even worse for an attacker. The only general, though impractical,
approach involves forming an ansatz, and solving the resulting quadratic system of multivariate
polynomial equations. So this attack fails.
Another approach Bob might try is to ask many queries of this sort, to generate a growing set
of polynomials pi = p1`1, pi
′ = p′1`1, pi
′′ = p′′1`1, et cetera. Now, `1 is a common right divisor of all
these polynomials, and as the set grows in size, it will very likely be the gcrd of the set. Hence, if S
were a Euclidean domain, Bob could use the Euclidean algorithm to find `1 with high probability.
However, S is not a Euclidean domain. The only hope for a potential attacker could be – similar to
the attack described in section 2.3.2 – a computation of a left Gro¨bner basis of the ideal generated by
the pis, if the notion of a left Gro¨bner basis exists for the chosen ring S (which does not, if S is chosen
non-Noetherian). Then, it is possible that the basis consists of only one element, namely `1. We made
experiments in the polynomial second Weyl algebra, choosing very small degrees (total degree less or
equal to five) for `1. With a sufficiently large number of these pis, the computed Gro¨bner basis had
indeed the desired structure. However, as the computation of a Gro¨bner basis is exponential space
hard [MM82], this is not a feasible approach in general. Even with slightly larger choices for these
degrees, the Gro¨bner basis computation in case of the second Weyl algebra fails to terminate within
a reasonable time. Other than this, we are not aware of any known practical method to find such a
common divisor for S.
Again, a general, though impractical, approach involves forming an ansatz, and solving the re-
sulting quadratic system of multivariate polynomial equations.
Similar remarks apply to Bob’s attempts to determine `2.
We conclude, therefore, that it will be impractical for Bob to determine a nontrivial factorization
of L by using Alice’s answers to his queries.
6 Conclusion
The key exchange primitive as presented in [BGG+10] has been altered to be immune against the
attack presented in [DK11], and extended. The new version presented in this paper continues to have
the positive properties discussed by Boucher et al. in their paper. The security of our proposal is
related to the hardness of factoring in non-commutative rings and the non-uniqueness of the factor-
ization. A class of insecure key choices that would reduce the problem to commutative factorization
was outlined. Moreover, we provide the freedom to choose rings that are not Noetherian, where a
general factorization algorithm might not even exist.
An implementation for a specific ring is provided and we look forward to feedback from users.
Furthermore, based on this implementation, we have published some challenge problems as described
in section 3.1. We encourage the reader to attack our proposed schemes via these challenges.
We also mention here that related protocols can be developed using this primitive. We presented
four such enhancements in section 5: a three-pass protocol, an ElGamal-like encryption scheme, and
an ElGamal-like digital signature scheme, and a zero-knowledge proof protocol.
Of course the security and practicality of our protocols need to be examined further for particular
choices of the non-commutative ring S, which is described in as general a way as possible in this article.
All of them can be broken if an algorithm to find a specific factorization in a feasible amount of time is
available. However, researchers have been interested in factoring Ore polynomials for decades, and this
problem is in general perceived as very difficult. As Ore polynomial rings are in general abstractions
of operator algebras, any success of breaking our protocols would lead to a further understanding of
the underlying operators. Thus any successful attempt to break our protocols, even if it is just for
one special choice of S, would benefit several scientific communities.
Moreover, we note that some of our proposed schemes bear a strong resemblance to others that
have been known, studied, and withstood general attacks for years, or even decades. For example,
our digital signature scheme can be viewed as an analogue of the ElGamal scheme, adapted for non-
commutative rings. But to the best of our knowledge, no proof of security, showing that breaking
the ElGamal signature scheme is equivalent to solving the discrete logarithm problem, has yet been
found. Instead, we have the accumulated experience of many cryptographers, who have so far found
no general method of attack that does not involve computing a discrete logarithm. This appears to
be the basis for accepting the scheme as secure. Now, given the similarity of our proposal to that
of ElGamal, one can plausibly suggest that ours will also be secure, unless – again – some practical
method of factorization is found.
Interesting questions for future research are: For which choices of a ring S of type (1) can one
construct an effective attack for the proposed schemes (possibly using quantum computers)? Note,
that the rings we chose for our examples and for our implementations are among the simplest ones
(Noetherian, bivariate, over finite fields) that appear to be immune to known attacks. And further-
more, can one improve the computation of the arithmetics in those rings using a quantum computer?
We also hope for better implementations in the future for arithmetics in Ore polynomials, since
the existing ones in commodity computer algebra systems appear to be slow on large examples.
This fact forced us to write our own experimental implementation to evaluate the feasibility of our
proposals.
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Appendix
A Code-Examples
A.1 Factorization of Chebyshev Differential Operators using MAPLE
A few simple MAPLE commands to set up and find right hand factors of the Chebyshev differential
operator (2) of section 1.2, with parameter n. In the code, D = ∂1, x = x1.
> with(DEtools):
> _Envdiffopdomain:=[D,x]:
> n := 11;
n := 11
> L := (1-x^2)*D^2 - x*D + n^2;
2 2
L := (1 - x ) D - x D + 121
> v := DFactorLCLM(L);
2 4 6 8 10
1 - 60 x + 560 x - 1792 x + 2304 x - 1024 x
v := [D - -------------------------------------------------,
3 5 7 9 1024 11
x - 20 x + 112 x - 256 x + 256 x - ---- x
11
3 5 7 9
x -120 x + 2240 x - 10752 x + 18432 x - 10240 x
D - --------------- - -------------------------------------------------]
(x - 1) (x + 1) 2 4 6 8 10
1 - 60 x + 560 x - 1792 x + 2304 x - 1024 x
Here, the two components of v are the two possible right hand factors of L. By rerunning the
commands with other (positive integer) values of n, the growth in the factors can be observed. Other
classical operators from the 1800’s, such as those of Hermite, Legendre, and Laguerre, have similar
behaviour.
